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We analyze the two-stage games induced by competitive equilibrium rules for the 
buyer-seller market of Shapley and Shubik (1972). In these procedures, first sellers and 
then buyers report their valuation and the outcome is determined by a competitive 
equilibrium outcome for the market reported by the agents. We provide results 
concerning buyers and sellers’ equilibrium strategies. In particular, our results point out 
that, by playing first, sellers are able to instigate an outcome that corresponds to the 
sellers’ optimal competitive equilibrium allocation for the true market. 
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We analyze a one-to-one buyer-seller market where a set of possibly heterogeneous 
sellers and a set of possibly heterogeneous buyers meet. Each seller owns one 
indivisible object, for which he has a certain valuation. Each buyer places a monetary 
value on each of the objects and she is interested in acquiring at most one of them. This 
market is a version of the assignment game, introduced in Shapley and Shubik (1972). 
While we refer to the model as the buyer-seller market, many other markets enter into 
our framework, including the labor markets in which workers sell their services for 
salaries. 
For the buyer-seller market an outcome consists of a matching function that states 
who buys from whom (and which agent does not sell or does not buy), and a vector of 
prices for the objects. Gale (1960) proposes the competitive equilibrium as a reasonable 
solution concept for this market. In a competitive equilibrium, the demand of every 
buyer is satisfied (that is, each buyer receives an object that maximizes her surplus, 
given the prices, whenever this surplus is non-negative), the price of each unsold object 
is its seller’s reservation price, and no two buyers are assigned the same object. Gale 
(1960) also proves the existence of competitive equilibrium outcomes. Shapley and 
Shubik (1972) show that a competitive equilibrium matching is an optimal matching, in 
the sense that it maximizes the sum of the gains of the whole set of agents. They also 
prove that the set of competitive equilibrium prices forms a complete lattice whose 
extreme points are the minimum and the maximum equilibrium prices, which are called 
buyer-optimal and seller-optimal competitive prices, respectively.4 Finally, it is possible 
to define a cooperative model for the buyer-seller market and the previous results also 
apply to the cooperative model because the core coincides with the set of competitive 
equilibrium payoffs (Shapley and Shubik, 1972). 
Competitive equilibria provide efficient, stable, and envy-free allocations. 
However, they may be very difficult to obtain through decentralized processes with 
contracts, bids, offers, and counter offers. In this paper we explore the idea of using 
competitive equilibria as the basis for centralized mechanisms that set the prices for the 
objects and allocate them to the buyers. In any such mechanism, the designer announces 
                                                          
4 Kelso and Crawford (1982) extend the analysis to many-to-one matching models. Sotomayor (2007) 
introduces the concept of a competitive equilibrium payoff for the multiple-partners assignment game and 
extends the previous results for this environment. 
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a competitive equilibrium rule, that is, a function that selects a particular competitive 
equilibrium for every possible market. 
The adoption of a centralized mechanism requires the designer to request the 
valuations of sellers and buyers who may have an incentive to manipulate their report. 
This issue was partially addressed in the literature by studying the incentives for truthful 
reporting by the agents of one side of the market, considering that the agents of the 
other side do not have any room for strategic behavior. Demange (1982) and Leonard 
(1983) provide a “non-manipulability theorem” for the assignment game: if the designer 
uses the buyer-optimal (respectively, the seller-optimal) competitive equilibrium rule 
then no buyer (respectively, seller) can profit by misstating her (or his) true valuations.5 
However, Demange and Gale (1985), Roth and Sotomayor (1990), and Pérez-Castrillo 
and Sotomayor (2013) show that agents have an incentive to manipulate their report if 
they do not obtain their most preferred competitive equilibrium allocation.6 
In this paper, we propose and analyze a mechanism (a “game”) where both the 
sellers and the buyers report their valuation and the outcome is given by a competitive 
equilibrium outcome for the market reported by the agents. In addition, given that there 
may be several competitive matchings in the market, the buyers are also requested to 
send a “signal” that will only be used to select among the optimal matchings, whenever 
several optimal matchings exist. The game has two stages because sellers, 
simultaneously and non-cooperatively, report their valuations first and, once these are 
known, buyers, simultaneously and non-cooperatively, are asked to make their reports. 
Once the agents have played, the competitive price rule maps the matrix of valuations 
announced by the sellers and the buyers to a competitive price vector for the 
corresponding market and the matching rule determines a competitive allocation of the 
objects to the buyers. Although we know that in this game some agents will typically 
have an incentive to misreport their valuation, we show that the equilibria of the game 
are, in general, competitive equilibrium outcomes for the true market. 
After the sellers report their valuations, the second stage begins. The analysis of 
                                                          
5 Demange and Gale (1985) extend the theorem to a model where the utilities are continuous in money, 
but are not necessarily linear. Pérez-Castrillo and Sotomayor (2013) prove that buyers (respectively, 
sellers) do not have an incentive to misreport their valuation if the buyer-optimal (respectively, seller-
optimal) competitive equilibrium is used by the designer in a one-to-many (respectively, many-to-one) 
buyer-seller market. 
6 Papers analyzing the consequences of manipulation in marriage and the college admission models, that 
is, in models where there are no prices, include Gale and Sotomayor (1985a, 1985b), Roth (1985), Roth 
and Sotomayor (1990), Sotomayor (2008), Kojima and Pathak (2009), Ma (2010), Sotomayor (2012), and 
Jaramillo, Kayi, and Klijn (2013). 
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this stage is interesting in itself because it also allows us to understand the buyers’ 
behavior when the sellers’ valuations are given, for example, because they are public 
knowledge or because sellers cannot manipulate them. We develop the analysis of this 
stage in two parts. In the first part, we construct specific strategies for the buyers that 
satisfy that a buyer’s report is always lower than her true valuation (which guaranties 
that she will never pay more for an object than her valuation) and show that they 
constitute a Nash equilibrium (NE) that leads to the minimum competitive price for the 
market where the buyers’ valuations are the true valuations and the sellers’ valuations 
correspond to those reported. That is, by choosing their reports, buyers can non-
cooperatively “select” their best competitive outcome, given the sellers’ reports.  
Since truth-telling is a dominant strategy for the buyers when the minimum 
competitive price vector is selected, the second part of the analysis of the buyers’ 
behavior concentrates on competitive price rules that do not select the minimum 
competitive price, whenever several competitive prices exist. For these rules, we fully 
characterize the set of the buyers’ NE. We provide a condition under which the set of 
NE allocations coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium allocations. This holds, 
for example, for every market where the number of sellers is larger than the number of 
buyers. For the other markets, the set of competitive equilibria that are sustained as NE 
outcomes is smaller than the set of all competitive equilibria. 
Finally, we look for the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) of the two-stage game. 
Thus, we analyze sellers’ strategies and the outcome of the whole game. The main 
results reveal that, by playing first, sellers are able to achieve an outcome that 
corresponds to the sellers’ optimal competitive equilibrium allocation for the true 
market. We construct a vector of strategies that constitute an SPE for any competitive 
equilibrium rule and that lead to the maximum competitive prices. Furthermore, we 
provide reasonable conditions under which every SPE outcome selects the maximum 
competitive prices. 
In addition to the papers studying the manipulability of competitive equilibrium 
rules which we reviewed above, our paper is related to the literature that looks for 
mechanisms (unrelated to competitive equilibrium rules) that implement stable or 
competitive allocations. For the assignment game, Kameke (1989) and Pérez-Castrillo 
and Sotomayor (2002) propose variants of sequential mechanisms where sellers choose 
prices first and then buyers choose objects that implement the maximum competitive 
equilibrium outcome. In the (many-to-one) job market matching, Alcalde, Pérez-
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Castrillo, and Romero-Medina (1998) offer simple mechanisms that implement the set 
of stable allocations in SPE when there are at least two firms, and Hayashi and Sakai 
(2009) study the Nash implementation of the competitive equilibrium correspondence, 
in addition to proposing mechanisms that lead to this correspondence. 
Our paper contributes to the early literature that studies the behavior of buyers or 
sellers in centralized mechanisms by providing the equilibrium behavior of both buyers 
and sellers in any centralized competitive equilibrium rule where sellers play first. It 
also adds to the implementation literature by providing quite simple and direct 
mechanisms (where agents are asked to report their valuation) that lead to competitive 
equilibria. In addition to requesting each seller and buyer his or her valuations, the 
mechanism only requires the buyers to signal some matching(s) to break ties in case 
several optimal matchings exist for the reported market. The tie breaking rule in our 
mechanism is quite natural, and it gives enough instruments to the agents to ensure the 
existence of SPE in the game.7 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model. In section 3 
we introduce the game that we analyze. Section 4 is devoted to a study of the buyers’ 
strategies, and section 5 analyzes the sellers’ strategies and the equilibrium of the game. 
Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
2. THE BUYER-SELLER MARKET  
In the buyer-seller market, there is a set  B  with  m  buyers,  B = {b1, b2,…, bm}, 
and a set  S  with  n  sellers,  S ={s1, s2,…,sn}. Each seller  sk  owns one indivisible 
object and each buyer  bj  wants to buy, at most, one object. We use the same notation 
for the seller and his object. Letters  j  and  k  are assigned to index buyers and objects 
(or sellers), respectively. 
Each seller  sk  values his object in  rk  0. Concerning the valuation of the objects 
for buyers, for each pair  (bj, sk)  there is a number  ajk  (possibly negative) representing 
the value of object  sk  for  bj. We denote by  aj  the vector of values ajk’s. The valuation 
matrix of the buyers and the valuation vector of the sellers are denoted by  a  and  r, 
respectively. We use the notation  M(a, r)  for the market  (B, S; a, r)  where  a  and  r  
may vary but  B  and  S  are fixed. 
                                                          
7 Tie breaking rules are common in mechanism design. See, for instance, Pérez-Castrillo and Sotomayor 
(2002) for the assignment game. Some papers use alternatives to tie breaking rules to ensure existence of 
equilibria. For instance, for the combinatorial assignment problem where monetary transfers are not 
allowed, Budish (2011) proposes the use of “approximate competitive equilibrium” notions. 
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We denote by  ajk(r)  the potential gains from trade for the pair  (bj, sk), that is,  
ajk(r)  ajk  rk  if  ajk  rk  0  and  a(r)jk  0  otherwise. We say that object  sk  is 
acceptable to  bj  if  ajk  rk  0  and it is unacceptable otherwise. If buyer  bj  purchases 
object  sk  at price  pk  rk  her payoff is  ajk  pk  and the payoff of seller  sk  is  pk  rk. 
When each seller’s reservation price is  0  and all objects are acceptable to every buyer, 
the corresponding model is the Shapley and Shubik’s (1972) assignment game.8 
A matching is an assignment of the objects to the buyers. Formally, a matching for  
M(a, r)  is a matrix  x = (xjk)  of zeros and ones. We say that matching  x  for  M(a, r)  is 
feasible if  j xjk  1  for all  sk  S,  k xjk  1  for all  bj  B, and a(r)jk  0  if  xjk = 1.9 
That is, a feasible matching assigns an object to at most one buyer and a buyer to at 
most one object. Moreover, the object assigned to a buyer must be acceptable to her. If  
xjk = 1, we say that  bj  is matched to  sk  or  sk  is matched to  bj, in which case both 
agents are active at  x. If  xjk = 0  for all  sk  S  (respectively,  bj  B), we say that  bj  
(respectively,  sk)  is unmatched. Of particular interest are optimal matchings. A feasible 
matching  x  is optimal if   j,k ajk(r) xjk  j,k ajk(r) xjk  for all feasible matchings  x  
and if  bj  and  sk  are both unmatched, then  sk  is not acceptable to  bj. 
Feasible allocations for a market M(a, r)  involve feasible matchings and feasible 
prices  p, that is, prices that are not lower than the sellers’ valuations:  pk  rk  for all     
sk  S. The payoff vector of the buyers corresponding to a feasible allocation  (p, x)  is  
uj = ajk  pk  if  xjk = 1  and  uj = 0  if  bj  is unmatched, and we say that the matching  x  
is compatible with the payoff vector  (u, p  r) and vice versa. 
Given feasible prices  p, the demand set of buyer  bj  is the set  D(bj, p)  defined as 
D(bj, p) = {sk  S; ajk  pk  0  and  ajk  pk  ajt  pt  for all  st  S}. 
Thus, among all the acceptable objects that buyer  bj  can acquire given the price vector  
p, she demands those that maximize her payoff.  
 
Definition 1. A feasible allocation  (p, x)  for  M(a, r) is a competitive equilibrium if   
(i) every active buyer  bj  is assigned to some  sk  D(bj, p); (ii) for all unmatched 
buyers  bj  we have that  ajk  pk  0  for all  sk  S,  and  (iii)  pk = rk  if  sk  is 
unmatched. 
                                                          
8 See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for an overview of this model.   
9 We use the notation  j  for the sum over all  bj  in  B,  k  for the sum over all  sk  in  S  and  j,k  for 
the sum over all  bj  in  B  and  sk  in  S. 
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If  (p, x)  is a competitive equilibrium allocation for  M(a, r),  p  is called a 
competitive equilibrium price vector or simply a competitive price and  x  is called a 
competitive matching. We denote by  E(a, r)  the set of competitive equilibrium 
allocations for  M(a, r). 
By using linear programming, Shapley and Shubik (1972) prove that  E(a, r)  is 
always non-empty when  r = (0,…, 0)  and all values  ajk’s  are non-negative.10 They also 
show the existence of a maximum and of a minimum competitive equilibrium 
allocation. The same results apply for any reservation price vector  r  and any valuation 
matrix  a. We denote (p, x)  and  (p, x), respectively, a maximum and a minimum 
competitive equilibrium price allocation for  M(a, r). The extreme competitive prices  
p(a, r)  and  p(a, r)  can be computed as follows. Denote  Va,r(B, S)  the maximum total 
worth of the market  (B, S; a, r), that is,  Va,r(B, S)   max BS a(r)jk.xjk, with the 
maximum to be taken over all feasible matchings  x  for  M(a, r). Then11 
(i) pk(a, r) = Va,r(B, S)  Va,r(B, S{sk}) + rk 
(ii) pk(a, r) = Va,r(B{bj}, S)  Va,r(B{bj}, S{sk}) + rk  if  xjk = 1  and  
      pk(a, r) = rk  if  sk  is unmatched at  x. 
Shapley and Shubik (1972) also prove that if a matching is part of a competitive 
equilibrium allocation, then the matching is optimal. Moreover, any pair composed by a 
competitive price vector and an optimal matching is a competitive equilibrium 
allocation. 
 
3. THE TWO-STAGE GAME 
Competitive equilibria satisfy, among others, the desirable properties of efficiency 
and envy-freeness – no buyer envies the situation of another one. Thus, it is reasonable 
to use them as mechanisms for allocating objects to buyers. In any such mechanisms, 
the designer needs to know the valuations of the sellers and buyers. However, sellers 
and buyers may have an incentive to report valuations that are not the true ones. We 
consider this situation as a game, where each seller and buyer is requested to report his 
or her valuations and the outcome is given by a competitive equilibrium allocation for 
the reported market. The game also includes a mechanism that allows a selection among 
the optimal matchings, when their number for the reported market is larger than one. 
                                                          
10 This result was also proved in Sotomayor (2000) by using combinatorial arguments. 
11 See Demange (1982) and Leonard (1983). 
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We consider a two-stage game where first sellers and then buyers are asked to 
report their valuations. Given the reports, a competitive equilibrium rule  (П, f), 
composed by a competitive price rule  П  and a matching rule f, will select a 
competitive allocation for the reported market. Formally, we study the following two-
stage game  (a, r, П, f), where the set of players is  BS  and the players’ true 
valuations are  (a, r). 
First stage: Sellers play simultaneously. A strategy for seller  sk  consists of choosing a 
reservation price  rk  0  for his object. 
Second stage: Knowing the choices of the sellers, buyers play simultaneously. A 
strategy for buyer  bj  is a pair of functions  (aj, j)  defined as follows. For each vector 
of reservation prices  r = (r1,…, rm), the function  aj  selects a valuation vector  aj(r) 
 (aj1(r),..., ajn(r))  and the function  j  gives a signal vector   j(r) = (j1(r),…, 
jn(r))  of zeros and ones. 
To explain the outcome of the game, denote  a(r)  (a1(r),…, am(r)). Similary, 
denote the matrix of signals by  (r). We say that an optimal matching for  M(a(r), r)  
is signalized by  (r)  if it maximizes  j,k jk(r) yjk  over all optimal matchings  y  in  
M(a(r), r).12 Then, given the profile of decisions  (r; a, ) (where  a = a(r)  and      
 = (r)), the function  П  associates the competitive price  П(a, r) = (П1(a, r),…, 
Пn(a, r))  for  the market  M(a, r). That is, the selection rule  П  chooses  П(a, r)  out 
of the set of competitive equilibrium prices for  M(a, r). Moreover, the function  f  
associates the optimal matching  f(a, r, )  for  M(a, r), which is a matching 
signalized by  . When there are several signalized optimal matchings, the function  f  
uses some deterministic criterion specified a priori (e.g., all matchings are indexed and 
the matching rule chooses  xi  if  xi  is present and  x1, x2,…, xi1  are not present).13   
Then, the true payoffs of buyer  bj  and seller  sk  under the allocation  (П(a, r); x)  
are, respectively, 
Uj(П(a, r); x) = ajk – Пk(a, r)  if  xjk = 1  and  
Uj(П(a, r); x) = 0  if  bj  is unmatched at  x. 
Vk(П(a, r); x) = Пk(a, r)  rk  if  sk  is matched at  x  and 
                                                          
12 The definition of  (r)  implies that the buyers can signalize any optimal matching  x  for  M(a(r), r)  
by choosing  (r) = x. More generally, they can signalize any subset  S  of  optimal matchings for  
M(a(r), r) by selecting  jk(r) = 1  if there is some matching  x  in  S  such that  xjk = 1  and  jk(r) = 0  
otherwise. 
13 We can also consider that each matching in this set has the same probability of being selected. 
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Vk(П(a, r); x) = 0  otherwise. 
 
We notice that the sincere strategy profile of the sellers corresponds to  r = r. The 
sincere strategy profile of the buyers is given by  aj(r) = a  for every  r  together with 
an arbitrary  . 
We are interested in analyzing the class of all two-stage games  (a, r, П, f)  and 
we use SPE as the solution concept. Thus, we first analyze the buyers’ behavior once 
the sellers have taken their decision and then we study the sellers’ equilibrium behavior.  
 
4. BUYERS’ STRATEGIES 
In this section we study the NE of  G(a, r, П, f), the strategic game that starts once 
the sellers’ profile of strategies  r  has been selected and the outcome function is given 
by a competitive equilibrium rule  (П, f). Since  r  is fixed throughout this section, we 
drop it from our notations and we denote  a  a(r),  M(a)  M(a(r), r), and so on. 
Also,  p(a)  and  p(a)  are the maximum and the minimum competitive prices for  
M(a)  and  u(a)  and  u(a)  are the corresponding buyers’ payoffs. 
 
4.1. PRELIMINARY RESULTS ON THE BUYERS’ STRATEGIES 
The results by Demange and Gale (1985) and Sotomayor (1986) and (1990) ensure 
that a buyer never has an incentive to misrepresent her valuation when the minimum 
competitive price is selected. That is,  (aj, j)  is a dominant strategy for every buyer  bj, 
for any signal    if the competitive price rule  П  is  П(a) = p(a). On the other hand, 
Pérez-Castrillo and Sotomayor (2013) show that  (a, )  is never a NE if  П(a)  p(a). 
The incentives for the buyers to misrepresent their true valuations depend on 
whether the rule leads to the minimum competitive equilibrium allocation. Therefore, 
while we develop part of the analysis for any competitive equilibrium rule, some results 
focus on the games  G(a, r, П, f)  such that  П(a)  p(a)  when  M(a)  has more than 
one competitive price, a set that we denote by  C+. For example, the competitive price 
rules given by a convex combination of the maximum and the minimum competitive 
price rules are in  C+. That is, {П; П =  П + (1  ) П, with    (0, 1]}  C+. 
If the competitive price rule is in  C+, the NE certainly involve a misrepresentation 
of the valuations by the buyers. Thus, it is natural to expect that the competitiveness of 
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the NE allocations (when they exist) under the true valuations are affected when buyers 
behave strategically.  
We present two examples that motivate our results. Example 1 illustrates a 
situation in which (i) not every competitive equilibrium for  M(a)  (in particular, the 
maximum competitive price) is reached through NE strategies satisfying  a  a;          
(ii) when  M(a)  has several competitive prices then  a  is not an NE if  П(a)  p(a);   
(iii) some NE allocations are not competitive for  M(a); (iv) when the NE strategy 
profile satisfies  a  a  and  M(a)  has only one competitive price then the NE is a 
competitive equilibrium allocation for  M(a)  and  П(a) = p(a); and (v) the fact that a 
profile of strategies is or is not an NE under some competitive price rule is independent 
of which prices are associated with other strategy profiles under this rule.  
 
Example 1. The market is given by  B = {b1, b2},  S = {s1},  r1 = 0  and  a = (8, 7). The 
set of competitive prices is  [7, 8]. Assume that  П(a)  p(a) = 7. It is a matter of 
verification that if  a  is an NE and  a  a  then either  a1 = a2 = 7  or  a1 = 7  and    
a2 < 7. In the first case, there are two optimal matchings:  x  with  x11 = 1  and  x  with  
x21 = 1. The profile  (a, )  is an NE  if and only if    signalizes the matching  x. In 
this case,  П(a) = 7 = p(a) = p(a)  and  (a, )  is an NE for the game  G(a, r, П, f)  
for every competitive price rule  П. In the second case,  x  is the only optimal matching 
for  M(a). Then any    signalizes  x. We can check that for any  ,  (a, )  is an NE for 
the game  G(a, r, П, f)  if and only if  П(a) = a2 = p(a). 
In both NE,  П(a) = p(a)  and  p(a)  is competitive for  M(a). However, in the 
second case  a2 < 7, so  П(a)  is not a competitive price for  M(a). Also, there are 
competitive prices for  M(a)  that are not the outcome of any NE  a  with  a  a  as, for 
example,  p(a) = 8. If we relax the assumption that  a  a  then every competitive price 
of   M(a)  can be reached via NE strategies. Indeed, if  (p, x)  E(a), then  (a, ),  with  
ajk = pk  for all  (bj, sk)  and   signalizes the matching  x,  is an NE and  (p, x)  is the 
resulting NE allocation. Finally, this example also illustrates that for any two 
competitive price rules  П1  and  П2  such that  П1(a) = П2(a),  (a, )  is an NE under  
П1  if and only if  (a, )  is an NE under  П2.   
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When buyers select  aj  aj  and  there is only one seller, it is easy to verify that the 
only NE payoff is  (u, v). Example 1 has shown that this is not always true when        
|S| > 1  because, in that example, some NE allocations are not competitive equilibrium 
allocations for  M(a). Example 2 illustrates a market where there are NE outcomes  
(П(a), f(a, ))  that satisfy that  П(a) is a competitive price for  M(a)  but it is different 
from  p(a), even when  aj  aj  for all  bj. 
 
Example 2. ((a, )  is an NE,  aj  aj  for all  bj,  П(a) ≠ p(a)  is competitive for  
M(a))  Consider B = {b1, b2, b3},  S = {s1, s2},  a1 = (8, 7),  a2 = (5, 6),  a3 = (4, 5)  and   
r = (0, 0). The minimum competitive equilibrium for this market is  (p = (4, 5), x), 
where  x11 = x22 = 1. Let  (П, f)  be any competitive equilibrium rule. Let buyers choose  
(a, )  where   = x, a1 = (5, 5), a2 = (5, 5), and  a3 = (4, 5). Then,  p(a) = p(a) = 
(5, 5), so there is only one competitive price in  M(a), and so  П(a) = (5, 5). Matching  
x  is optimal for  M(a), so it is the only matching signalized by  . The corresponding 
true payoff vector for the buyers is  U(П(a); x) = (3, 1, 0). Clearly  (П(a); x)  is a 
competitive equilibrium under the true valuations. Moreover, we can check that  (a, )  
is an NE of the game  G(a, r, П, f)  and П(a) = (5, 5), which differs from  p(a).   
 
Theorems 1 and 2 show that the phenomena described in (ii) and (v) of Example 1, 
respectively, are not accidents. In particular, Theorem 1 states that if  (a, )  is an NE 
of the game G(a, r, П, f), where  a  may or may not be the true buyers’ valuations, the 
selection rule must be giving the buyer-optimal price vector under the reported buyers’ 
valuations, regardless of the choice of the selection rule. 
 
Theorem 1.   Let  (a, )  be an NE for  G(a, r, П, f). Then,  (a) = p(a). 
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that  П(a)  p(a). Then,  Пk(a) > pk(a)  0  
for an object  sk  S, and  sk  must be matched to some  bj  under  x  f(a, ). Let  u(a)  
and  u(a)  be the payoff vectors for the buyers corresponding to  П(a)  and  p(a), 
respectively. We have that  uj(a) > uj(a). Let    Rn+  be such that  
uj(a) > j > uj(a).                 (1) 
Define  ȃ  as follows:  ȃjk = ajk  j,  ȃjt < 0  if  st  sk, and  ȃt = at  if  bt  bj. By 
(1) and because  x  is compatible with  p(a)  we can write that  ȃjk = ajk  j >           
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ajk  uj(a) = pk(a)  rk. Then,   
ȃjk > pk(a)  rk           (2) 
and  sk  is acceptable to  bj  in  M(ȃ). We claim that  bj  is matched under any optimal 
matching for  M(ȃ). In fact, arguing by contradiction, suppose that  bj  is unmatched 
under some optimal matching  x  for  M(ȃ). By definition of the function  Va  we can 
write:  Va(B{bj}, S) = Vȃ(B, S)  (ȃjk  rk) + Vȃ(B{bj}, S{sk}) > pk(a) – rk + 
Va(B{bj}, S{sk}), where (2) was used in the last inequality. However, by the 
expression of the minimum competitive price we have that  pk(a) – rk = Va(B{bj}, S) 
 Va(B{bj}, S{sk}) > pk(a) – rk, which is a contradiction.    
Since any object other than  sk  is not acceptable to  bj  in  M(ȃ),  bj  must be 
matched to  sk  at  any optimal matching for  M(ȃ). Then,  Пk(ȃ)  ȃjk = ajk  j. 
However,  ajk  j < ajk  uj(a)  by  (1).  Therefore,  Пk(ȃ) < ajk  uj(a) = Пk(a).  
Thus, for every optimal matching  y  for  M(ȃ), we have that  Uj(П(ȃ), y) = ajk  Пk(ȃ) 
> ȃjk  Пk(a) = Uj(П(a), x), which contradicts the fact that  (a, )  is an NE for       
G(a, r, П, f). Hence,  (a) = p(a).   
 
As stated before, in addition to its intrinsic interest, Theorem 1 helps us to better 
understand some of the facts discussed in Example 1. In that example, the profile of 
strategies  a1 = 7  and  a2 < 7  constitute an NE if and only if the competitive price rule  
П  satisfies  П(a) = a2 = p(a). Moreover, in the example, where  П  C+, the 
matching  x  is the only optimal matching for  M(a). However, when  П  C+, 
Proposition 1 below implies that, aside very special cases in which no agent is able to 
obtain a positive payoff, for a vector of reports  a  to be an NE, the number of optimal 
matchings must be greater than one. 
 
Proposition 1. Let  (a, )  be an NE of  G(a, r, П, f), where  П  C+. Suppose that           
ajk – rjk > 0  for at least one pair  (bj, sk)  B S. Then, there is more than one optimal 
matching in  M(a).  
Proof. By Theorem 1,  П(a) = p(a). Given that  П  C+,  П(a) = p(a)  is possible 
only if the set of competitive prices for  M(a)  is a singleton. The result then follows 
from Sotomayor (2002) who shows that if  ajk > rk  for at least one pair  (bj, sk)  B S  
and the set of competitive equilibrium prices has only one element, then there are 
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several optimal matchings for M(a).   
 
Theorem 2 states a relationship between the NE of two related games. 
 
Theorem 2. Let  П1  and  П2  be competitive price rules. Let  (a, )  be a profile of 
strategies such that  П1(a) = П2(a).  Then,  (a, )   is an NE of  G(П1, f)  if and only if  
(a, )  is an NE of  G(П2, f). 
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that  (a, )  is an NE of  G(П1, f)  but it is not 
an NE of  G(П2, f). Then there is a buyer  bj  and  (ȃ, )  with  ȃj = aj  and  j = j  
such that  Uj(П2(ȃ), f(ȃ, )) > Uj(П2(a), f(a, )).14 Buyer  bj  must be matched at     
f(ȃ, )  to some  sk  and for some   > 0  we have that  Uj(П2(ȃ), f(ȃ, ))   > 
Uj(П2(a), f(a, )). Moreover, by Theorem 1,  p(a) = П1(a) = П2(a), so  
Uj(П2(ȃ), f(ȃ, ))   > Uj(П1(a), f(a, )).         (3)  
Define  ã  such that  ãjk = П2k(ȃ) + ,  ãjt = 0  for all  st ≠ sk  and  ãj = aj. It is 
clear that  (П2(ȃ), f(ȃ, ))  is a competitive equilibrium allocation for  M(ã), so       
f(ȃ, )  is an optimal matching for  M(ã). In addition, the corresponding payoff for  bj  
is  ãjk  П2k(ȃ) =  > 0, so  bj  is matched under every optimal matching for  M(ã) 
(Demange and Gale, 1985). Also,  ãjk  П2k(ȃ) > ãjt  П2t(ȃ)  for every  st ≠ sk, so  bj  
only demands  sk  at prices  П2(ȃ). Hence, any competitive matching for  П2(ȃ)  must 
allocate  sk  to  bj. Given that any optimal matching for  M(ã)  is competitive for  П2(ȃ)  
we must have that  bj  is matched to  sk  at  f(ã, ). This implies that  П2k(ã) ≤ ãjk = 
П2k(ȃ) + . Then,  Uj(П2(ã), f(ã, )) = ajk  П2k(ã)  ajk  (П2k(ȃ) + ) = Uj(П2(ȃ), 
f(ȃ, ))   > Uj(П1(a), f(a, )), where the last inequality follows from (3). But then  
Uj(П2(ã), f(ã, )) > Uj(П1(a), f(a, )), which contradicts the hypothesis that  (a, )  is 
an NE of  G(П1, f).    
 
Corollaries 1 and 2 below follow easily from theorems 1 and 2, respectively.  
 
Corollary 1.  Let  (a, )  be an NE for G(, f), where  П  C+. Then, there is one and 
only one competitive equilibrium price for  M(a). 
 
                                                          
14 We write  aj  to denote the decision profile for the buyers other than  bj. 
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Corollary 2. Let  П1  and  П2  be competitive price rules in  C+. Then, the profile of 
strategies  (a, )  is an NE of  G(П1, f)  if and only if  (a, )  is an NE of  G(П2, f). 
 
4.2. MAIN RESULTS ON THE BUYERS’ STRATEGIES 
In this subsection, we address the existence and characteristics of the NE of the 
subgame  G(a, r, П, f). For that purpose, we develop two complementary analyses. In 
the first one, we concentrate on strategies that satisfy  a ≤ a, which may be a reasonable 
restriction in several environments. We conclude with the existence result in Theorem 5, 
which constructs an NE that leads to the minimum competitive price for the market  
M(a). Then, in the second analysis, whose final results are theorems 6 and 7, we fully 
characterize the set of NE of  G(a, r, П, f)  without restrictions on the type of strategies 
for any market. In the latest theorems, we focus on competitive price rules in  C+. 
Before presenting these two analyses, we provide a theorem that is interesting by 
itself and that will be used in the rest of the section. As Example 1 illustrates, the NE 
allocation does not always yield a competitive equilibrium for  M(a). Theorem 3 shows 
that the NE is a competitive equilibrium if there is only one competitive price vector in 
the market defined by the vector of reports. 
 
Theorem 3. Let  (a, )  be an NE of  G(a, r, П, f). If  M(a)  has only one competitive 
equilibrium price then  П(a)  is  a competitive equilibrium price for  M(a).  
Proof. Suppose that  (П(a), x)  is not a competitive equilibrium allocation for  M(a). 
For any pair  (bj, sk)  with  xjk = 1,  ajk – Пk(a)  0  because  bj  could obtain a zero true 
payoff by selecting  ȃjt < 0  for every  st, which would contradict that  a  is an NE. 
Then, there must exist some  bj,  st  and  sk, such that  xjt = 1  and  Uj(П(a), x) = ajt – 
Пt(a) < ajk – Пk(a). Let   > 0  such that  
Пk(a) < ajk – (Uj(П(a), x) + ).              (4) 
Define  ȃ  as follows:  ȃjk = ajk – (Uj(П(a), x) + ),  ȃjt < 0  if  st  sk  and  ȃt = at  
if  bt  bj. Choose any signal    and denote  y  f(ȃ, ). We have that  ȃjk – rk > 0  by 
(4)  and  ȃjt – rt < 0  if  st  sk. Then, if  bj  is active, he must be matched with  sk. We 
will show that  yjk = 1. Once this is established, it follows that  Пk(ȃ)  ȃjk  and then  
Uj(П(ȃ), y) = ajk – Пk(ȃ)  ajk – ȃjk = Uj(П(a), x) +  > Uj(П(a), x), which contradicts 
the assumption that  a  is an NE for  (П, f).   
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To prove that  yjk = 1, consider the market  M  (B–{bj}, S, aj, r). Let  p(M)  be 
the maximum competitive price for  M. If  yjk = 0, then  bj  is unmatched under  y  and  
Vȃ(B, S) = Vȃ(B–{bj}, S). By definition of  ȃ, we have that  Vȃ(B, S–{sk}) =          
Vȃ(B–{bj}, S–{sk}). Using the expression for the maximum equilibrium price,  pk(ȃ) – 
rk = Vȃ(B, S) – Vȃ(B, S–{sk}) = Vȃ(B–{bj}, S) – Vȃ(B–{bj}, S–{sk}) = pk(M) – rk, so  
pk(ȃ) = pk(M). On the other hand, Demange and Gale (1985) show that if a set of 
buyers leaves a market then the maximum equilibrium price does not increase, which  
implies that  pk(a)  pk(M). Therefore, 
pk(a)  pk(ȃ).                  (5) 
M(a)  has only one competitive equilibrium price, hence  
Пk(a) = pk(a).               (6) 
Thus,  pk(ȃ)  ȃjk  > Пk(a) = pk(a)  pk(ȃ), which is absurd, where the first 
inequality follows from the competitiveness of  (p(ȃ), y)  and from the assumption that  
bj  is unmatched at  y; in the second inequality we used (4) and the definition of  ȃjk; the 
equality is given by (6); and the last inequality follows from (5). Then,  bj  is necessarily 
matched under  y,  so  yjk = 1, which concludes the proof.   
 
Corollary 3. Let  (a, )  be an NE of  G(a, r, П, f). If  П  C+  then  П(a)  is  a 
competitive equilibrium price for  M(a). 
Proof. Corollary 1 implies that  M(a)  has only one competitive equilibrium price. 
Accordingly, the result follows from Theorem 3.   
 
We now proceed to construct strategies satisfying  ajk ≤ a  that constitute NE of  
G(a, r, П, f)  and whose outcome is the best competitive equilibrium for the buyers. We 
start with two lemmas. They use the idea of a “super-optimal” matching: we say that a 
matching  x  is super-optimal for  M(a)  and  M(a)  if it is optimal for both markets. 
 
Lemma 1. Let  p  be a competitive equilibrium price for  M(a)  and  u  the 
corresponding payoff for the buyers. Let  a  be defined by  ajk = ajk  uj  for  all  (bj, sk) 
 B S. Then  p  is a competitive equilibrium price for  M(a)  and all the optimal 
matchings for  M(a)  are super-optimal matchings for  M(a)  and  M(a).  
Proof. Let  x  be an optimal matching for M(a). Then,  (p, x)  is competitive for  M(a). 
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For the first assertion, use the competitiveness of  (p, x)  in  M(a)  to get that if  xjk = 1,  
ajk – pk = (ajk – pk) – uj  (ajt – pt) – uj = ajt – pt  for all  st  S. Also,  ajk – pk = ajk – uj – 
pk = 0, so sk  is acceptable to  bj  in  M(a). Therefore,  (p, x)  E(a). For the second 
assertion, we use the property that a matching in a competitive equilibrium allocation is 
necessarily optimal. Hence,  x  is also optimal for  M(a).   
 
Lemma 2. Let  p  be  the minimum competitive equilibrium price for  M(a)  and  u  
the corresponding payoff for the buyers. Let  a  be defined by  ajk = ajk  uj  for  all  
(bj, sk)  B S. Then, the set of competitive equilibrium prices for  M(a)  is a singleton 
and  p  is its only element.  
Proof. Let  x  be some optimal matching for  M(a). By Lemma 1,  (p, x)  E(a). Let  p  
be a competitive price for  M(a). If  xjk = 1  then  ajk – pk = ajk – uj + uj – pk = (ajk – pk) 
+ uj  (ajt – pt) + uj = ajt – uj + uj – pt = ajt – pt  for any  st  S. Also,  ajk – pk =      
(ajk – pk) + uj  0. Hence  (p, x)  E(a), from which it follows that  p  p*. On the other 
hand,  pk  ajk = ajk – uj = pk*  if  xjk = 1  and  pk = pk = rk  if  sk  is unmatched at  x. 
Then  p  p, which implies that  p = p.    
 
Theorem 4 highlights the strong link between the equilibrium of the strategies 
constructed in Lemma 2 and the super-optimality of the matching generated by the 
strategies. 
 
Theorem 4. Let  (a, )  be a strategy profile for the game  G(a, r, П, f)  such that      
ajk = ajk  uj  for each pair  (bj, sk)  B S. Then  (a, )   is an NE of  G(a, r, П, f)  if 
and only if  f(a, ) is super-optimal for  M(a)  and  M(a). 
Proof. Suppose that (a, )  is an NE of  G(a, r, П, f). Let  x  f(a, ). By Lemma 2, the 
set of competitive prices for  M(a)  is a singleton and  p  is its only element. Therefore, 
Theorem 3 implies that  (П(a), x)  E(a) and  x  is optimal for  both  M(a)  and  M(a). 
In the other direction, suppose by way of contradiction that  x  is a super-optimal 
matching for  M(a)  and  M(a)  but  (a, )  is not an NE of  G(a, r, П, f). Then, there 
exists some buyer  bj, some strategy profile  ȃ  with  ȃt = at  if  bt  bj, and some signal  
, such that   
Uj(П(ȃ), x) > Uj(П(a), x),            (7) 
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where  x = f(ȃ, ). 
If  bj  is active, say  xjl = 1, then  uj(a) = ȃjl – Пl(a) = ajl – Пl(a) – uj. Therefore,  
Uj(П(a), x) = ajl – Пl(a) = uj(a) + uj. If  bj  is unmatched at  x  then  uj(a) = 0  and  
Uj(П(a), x) = 0. By Lemma 1,  x  is optimal for  M(a), so  uj = 0. In both cases, 
Uj(П(a), x) = uj(a) + uj  0.             (8) 
From (7) and (8) it follows that  Uj(П(ȃ), x) > 0, so  bj  must be matched to some  
sk  under  x. Denote  Uj(П(ȃ), x)  the transfer associated with  x  in  M(a), that is,  
Uj(П(ȃ), x) = ajk – Пk(ȃ). Then,  Uj(П(ȃ), x) = (ajk – uj) – Пk(ȃ) = Uj(П(ȃ), x) – 
uj > Uj(П(a), x) – uj = uj(a) + uj – uj = uj(a), where the inequality and the second-
to-last equality follow from (7) and (8), respectively. By Lemma 2, there is only one 
competitive price in  M(a). Hence,  uj(a) = uj(a). This implies  Uj(П(ȃ), x) > uj(a), 
which contradicts Proposition 1 applied to  M(a). Hence,  (a, )  is an NE of             
G(a, r, П, f).    
 
Theorem 5 shows that the strategies constructed above, which are based on and 
lead to the minimum competitive price, constitute an NE of the game G(a, r, П, f), for 
any competitive equilibrium rule. In this way, the theorem provides a constructive proof 
of the existence of equilibrium. 
 
Theorem 5. For each pair  (bj, sk)  B S, let  ajk = ajk – uj  and  jk = 1  if  xjk = 1 for 
some optimal matching  x  for  M(a)  and  jk = 0  otherwise. Then,  (a, )  is an NE of 
any game  G(a, r, П, f). Furthermore,  U(П(a), f(a, )) = u. 
Proof. Consider any arbitrary game  G(a, r, П, f). By Lemma 1, the optimal matchings 
for  M(a)  are also optimal for  M(a)  and vice-versa. By definition of  , every optimal 
matching for  M(a)  is signalized, which implies that the set of matchings signalized by  
  coincides with the set of super-optimal matchings for  M(a). Then,  x = f(a, )  is 
super-optimal for  M(a)  and  M(a); so  (a, )  is an NE for  G(a, r, П, f). Also,      
П(a) = p  by Lemma 2. Therefore,  Uj(П(a), x) = ajk – pk* = uj  if  xjk = 1  and  
Uj(П(a), x) = 0 = uj  if  bj  is unmatched at  x, which completes the proof.   
 
The signal vector in the strategies proposed in Theorem 5 allows the buyers to 
signal matchings that are optimal for the true vector of buyers’ valuations. In this way, 
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the mechanism always picks super-optimal matchings when  П  C+. The role of this 
signal vector is crucial for guaranteeing the existence of NE of the game  G(a, r, П, f). 
Theorem 5 proposes strategies that yield the optimal competitive equilibrium for 
the buyers as an NE. Example 3 illustrates that there may be NE strategies  (a, ), 
where  a  is not defined as in Theorem 5, that yields the optimal competitive 
equilibrium for the buyers. Thus, coordination problems may still exist. 
 
Example 3. ((a, )  is a Nash equilibrium that is not defined as in Theorem 5, but 
(a) = p(a)). Consider  B = {b1, b2},  S = {s1, s2},  aj = (4, 3)  for  j = 1, 2, and  rk = 0  
for  k = 1, 2. The  buyer-optimal competitive equilibrium payoff for this market is  u1 = 
u2 = 3,  v1 = 1,  v2 = 0. For each pair  (bj, sk)  B S, let  ajk = ajk  j  where  1 = 2  
and  2 = 3. Then,  (a, )  is an NE for every competitive equilibrium rule and for every  
. Furthermore,  (u, v)  is the corresponding NE payoff. However,     u.    
 
When we look for the NE of the game  G(a, r, П, f)  without restrictions on the 
type of strategies that buyers use, we have more precise information on the set of NE 
outcomes and the relationship between this set and the set of competitive equilibrium 
allocations of the market  M(a). In particular, we can provide a full characterization of 
the set of NE outcomes if the competitive price rule is in C+. The main results, which 
are theorems 6 and 7 below, are immediate consequences of the following lemmas 3 
and 4 and previous results. We use the notation  S1(p)  {sk  S; pk > rk}. 
 
Lemma 3. Let (p, x)  be a competitive equilibrium of  M(a). If  B > S1(p), then 
there is an NE of  G(a, r, П, f)  whose NE allocation is  (p, x). 
Proof. Consider the following strategies:  aj = p  and  j = xj  for all  bj  B. Given that  
p  is a competitive price of  M(a),  p ≥ r. Moreover, if xjk = 1, then  Va(B, S) = 
Va(B{bj}, S) = t (pt  rt)  because  B > S1(p)  allows all the objects in  S1(p)  to 
be matched to a buyer (and the surplus of the other objects, according to  a, is zero). 
Similarly, Va(B, S{sk}) = Va(B{bj}, S{sk}) = t≠k (pt  rt)  for all sk  S. Therefore,  
pk(a)  rk = Va(B, S) Va(B, S{sk}) = pk  rk  and  pk(a)  rk = Va(B{bj}, S) 
Va(B{bj}, S{sk}) = pk  rk  for all sk  S,  which implies that the outcome of the 
strategy profile  (a, )  is necessarily  (П(a), f(a, )) = (p, x). 
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We now prove that  (a, )  is an NE of  G(a, r, П, f). Suppose that player  bj  
deviates to  (ȃj, j)  and denote  ȃ = (ȃj, aj)  and   = (j, j). Given that there are 
at least  S1(p)  buyers reporting valuation  p, any optimal matching for  M(ȃ)  
produces a value for the market at least equal to  skS\S1(p) (pk  rk)   and  k(ȃ) ≥ pk  
for all  sk  S1(p). Moreover,  k(ȃ) ≥ rk = pk  because  (ȃ)  is a competitive price 
vector. Therefore,  ajk  k(ȃ) ≤ ajk  pk  ≤ Uj(p, x) = Uj((a), f(a, ))  for any  sk  S. 
Thus,  bj  cannot improve by deviating to  ȃ.   
 
Lemma 4. Let (p, x)  be a competitive equilibrium of  M(a). If  B ≤ S1(p), then 
there is no NE of  G(a, r, П, f)  whose outcome is  (p, x). 
Proof. Suppose  (a, )  is an NE of  G(a, r, П, f)  and  (a) = p. By Theorem 1, we 
have that  p = p(a). Demange and Gale (1985) and Pérez-Castrillo and Sotomayor 
(2013) imply that the number of buyers must be larger than the number of sellers that 
obtain positive surplus, that is,  B > S1(p), which is not possible.   
 
For some markets, Lemma 3 allows us to state that the set of competitive equilibria 
coincides with the set of NE allocations. However, there are markets where the set of 
competitive equilibria that are sustained as NE outcomes of  G(a, r, П, f)  is smaller 
than the set of all competitive equilibria, although larger than the set of competitive 
equilibrium with minimum prices. We first illustrate that this can happen in Example 4 
and then we state the general results. 
 
Example 4. Let  B = {b1, b2},  S = {s1, s2},  a11 = 3,  a12 = 3,  a21 = 4,  a22 = 8,  r1 = r2 = 
0. It is easy to check that a vector of prices  p  is competitive if and only if  p1 ≤ 3,         
p2 ≥ p1  and  p2 ≤ 4 + p1. The minimum competitive price is  p = (0, 0)  and the set of 
competitive prices that are outcome of some NE of  G(a, r, П, f)  is  the set                
{(0, p2); p2  [0, 4]}, which is strictly smaller than the set of competitive equilibria.   
 
Denote  So = {sk  S; pk > rk  for some  (p, x)  E(a)}. Sellers in  So  are active in 
every competitive equilibrium, so  B ≥ So  always. 
 
Theorem 6. If  B > So  and  П  C+, then the set of NE allocations of  G(a, r, П, f)  
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coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium allocations of  M(a). 
Proof. For every  (p, x)  E(a), it happens that  S1(p)  So. Hence,  B > So  implies  
B > S1(p)  for every  (p, x)  E(a). According to Lemma 3, this implies that all 
competitive equilibrium allocations of  M(a)  are NE allocations of  G(a, r, П, f). On 
the other hand, Theorem 3 shows that all NE allocations of  G(a, r, П, f)  are 
competitive equilibrium allocations of  M(a)  if  П  C+.   
 
Corollary 4. If  B > S  and  П  C+, then the set of NE allocations of  G(a, r, П, f)  
coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium allocations of  M(a). 
 
Theorem 7. If  B = So  and  П  C+, then the set of NE outcomes of  G(a, r, П, f)  
corresponds to the set  {(p, x); (p, x)  E(a)  and  pk = rk  for some  sk  So}, which 
contains the set of minimum competitive price allocations of  M(a). 
Proof. First, Theorem 3 shows that all NE allocations of  G(a, r, П, f)  are competitive 
equilibrium allocations of  M(a)  if  П  C+. Second, consider  (p, x)  E(a), for which  
S1(p)  So. If  pk > rk  for all  sk  So, S1(p) = So  and, applying Lemma 4, there is no NE 
of  G(a, r, П, f)  whose outcome is  (p, x). On the other hand, if  pk = rk  for some         
sk  So, then  S1(p)  So  and, applying Lemma 3, there is an NE of  G(a, r, П, f)  whose 
outcome is  (p, x). Finally, Theorem 5 implies that the set  {(p, x); (p, x)  E(a)  and      
pk = rk  for some  sk  So}  includes the set of minimum competitive price allocations of  
M(a).   
 
5. SELLERS’ STRATEGIES AND EQUILIBRIUM OF THE GAME 
The analysis of section 4 shows that, for any sellers’ choice  r, buyers can get  
u(r)  by playing the equilibrium strategies  a  identified in Theorem 5. We now show 
that, in equilibrium, sellers can reverse this situation. 
We use some of the results in section 4 first to construct an SPE for the two-stage 
game  Г(П, f)  for any competitive equilibrium rule  (П, f)  and then to characterize the 
outcome of all the SPE of the game under certain conditions. The construction of an 
SPE uses two instrumental lemmas, where we denote  p  and  p, respectively, the 
maximum and the minimum competitive prices for the true market  M(a, r). 
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Lemma 5. p  is the only competitive equilibrium price for market  M(a, r = p).   
Proof. Let  x  be an optimal matching for  M(a, r). Then,  (p, x)  E(a, r). Clearly,    
(p, x)  E(a, p)  also, so  x  is an optimal matching for  M(a, p). Let  p  be some 
competitive price for  M(a, p). We claim that  p = p. In fact, the feasibility of  p  in  
M(a, p)  implies that    
pk  pk  rk  for all  sk  S.           (9) 
Then  p  is feasible for  M(a, r). Moreover, if  sk  is unmatched at  x  then  pk = pk = 
rk , so  pk = rk. The competitiveness of  (p, x)  in  M(a, r)  therefore follows from the 
competitiveness of  (p, x)  in  M(a, p). Then, the maximality of  p  in  M(a, r)  implies 
pk  pk   for all  sk  S.           (10) 
By (9) and (10) we obtain that  p = p.   
 
Lemma 6. Let  r  be a vector of reservation prices for the sellers such that  rk > pk  
for some  sk  S  and  rt = pt  for all  st  S{sk}. Then,  sk  is unmatched at any 
competitive equilibrium for  M(a, r). 
Proof. If  (p, x)  E(a, r)  and  sk  is matched at  x, then  (p, x)  E(a, p)  also, and so  
p = p  by  Lemma 5. However,  pk  rk > pk, which is a contradiction.  
 
Theorem 8 proposes strategies for the sellers and the buyers and shows that they 
constitute an SPE of the game  (a, r, П, f), for any competitive equilibrium rule  (П, f). 
In this SPE, the sellers report valuations that correspond to the maximum competitive 
prices for the true market and the buyers follow the strategy proposed in Theorem 5, 
which leads to the minimum competitive prices for the “reported” market. The fact that 
sellers choose first gives them a crucial advantage and the SPE allocation corresponds 
to the sellers’ optimal competitive equilibrium allocation for the true market. 
 
Theorem 8. Let  (a(.), (.))  be defined as follows:  ajk(r) = ajk  uj(a, r)  for each  
(bj, sk)  B S  and for all  r,  jk(r) = 1  if  xjk = 1 for some optimal matching  x  for  
M(a, r)  and  jk(r) = 0  otherwise. Then,  (p, a(.), (.))  constitutes an SPE of       
(a, r, П, f)  for any competitive equilibrium rule  (П, f). At this SPE, the true payoffs of 
buyers and sellers are, respectively,  u*  and  p  r.  
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Proof.  By Theorem 5,  (a(r), (r))  is an NE of the subgame  G(r, (П, f)), for every  
r. Moreover,  П(a(r), r) = p(a, r)  and  U(П(a(r), r), f(a(r), r, (r))) = u(a, r). 
In particular, when  r = p,  (a(p), (p))  is an NE of G(p, (П, f)), and  П(a(p)) = 
p(p), which is the minimum competitive price of  M(a, p). By Lemma 5,  p  is the 
only competitive price for  M(a, p), so  П(a(p)) = p  and  u(p) = u(p) = u. Also,  
U(П(a(r)), f(a(r), r, (r))) = u*  and  V(П(a(r), r), f(a(r), r, (r))) = p  r.  
Thus, proving that  (p, a(.), (.))  is an SPE only requires showing that  pk  is a 
best response for every seller  sk  S. By playing  pk  seller  sk  gets  pk. If  sk  selects 
any other  rk, the competitive price is  П(a(r), r) = p(r), where  r  (rk, pk). 
There are two cases. First, if  rk < pk  then  p(r)  p(p) = p  because the 
maximum equilibrium price is not decreasing in the sellers’ reservation values 
(Demange and Gale, 1985). Hence,  П(a(r), r)k = p(r)k  pk, so  sk  cannot profit by 
deviating from  pk. Second, if  rk > pk, it follows from Lemma 6 that  sk  is unmatched 
at any competitive equilibrium for  M(a, r), so he obtains a true payoff of  0  pk  r k. 
Therefore,  sk  cannot profit by deviating from  pk  and  (a(r), p, (r))  is an SPE.  
 
Theorem 9 shows a stronger result than Theorem 8 when we restrict attention to 
competitive price rules in the set  C+. For any such rule, the strategy vector where sellers 
select the maximum competitive prices for the true market and the buyers follow any 
NE of the continuation game is an SPE of the game. 
 
Theorem 9. Consider any competitive price rule  П  C+. Let  (a(r), (r))  be an NE 
of the subgame  G(r, (П, f)), for every selection  r  by the sellers. Then,  (p, a(.), (.))  
is an SPE of  (a, r, П, f). At this SPE, the true payoffs of buyers and sellers are, 
respectively,  u  and  p  r. 
Proof. By Theorem 3, (П(a(p), p), f(a(p), p, ( p)))   E(a, p),  so  П(a(p), p) = 
p  and  x  f(a(p), p, ( p))  is optimal for  M(a, p). Then,  U(П(a(p), p), x) = u  
and  V(П(a(p), p), x) = p  r. 
The rest of the proof follows the same arguments as the proof of Theorem 8.  
 
Theorems 8 and 9 construct SPE whose outcome corresponds to the sellers’ 
optimal competitive equilibrium allocation for the true market. Is this allocation the 
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unique SPE of the game  (a, r, П, f)? Theorem 10, which constitutes our final result, 
states that this outcome is in fact the unique SPE outcome of any game  (a, r, П, f)  for 
price rules  П  in C+ provided that the sellers’ strategies satisfy two intuitive conditions: 
a seller’s report cannot be lower than his true valuation, and it is equal to the true 
valuation if he does not sell his object at the SPE even reporting that valuation. 
Theorem 10 makes use of Lemma 7, which states the outcome of any SPE when 
the price rule is in C+ as a function of the equilibrium strategy by the sellers. 
 
Lemma 7.  Consider any competitive price rule  П  C+. If  (r, a(.), (.))  is an SPE of  
(a, r, П, f), then  V(П(a(r), r), f(a(r), r, (r))) = p(a, r)  r  and  f(a(r), r, (r))  
is optimal for  M(a, r). 
Proof. Since  (a(r), (r))  is an NE for the buyers given  r  and  П  C+, Theorem 3 
implies that  (П(a(r), r), f(a(r), r, (r)))  E(a, r), so  x  f(a(r), r, (r))  is 
optimal for  M(a, r), and it is compatible with  p(a, r). Now, suppose by contradiction 
that  П(a(r), r)  p(r). Then, there is some seller  sk  such that  pk(a, r) > П(a(r), 
r)k  rk  so  pk(a, r) > rk  and  sk  is  matched under  x. Choose  ȓk  so that   
pk(a, r) > ȓk > П(a(r), r)  rk.             (11) 
Suppose that seller  sk  deviates from  r  by choosing  ȓk, and set  ȓ  (ȓk, rk). 
Because  (r, a(.), (.))  is an SPE of  (a, r, П, f), it is the case that  (a(ȓ), (ȓ))  is an 
NE for the buyers and  (П(a(ȓ), ȓ), f(a(ȓ), ȓ,(ȓ)))  E(a, ȓ). On the other hand, 
given that  ȓ > r,  pk(a, ȓ)  pk(a, r),  so  pk(a, ȓ) > ȓk  by (11), which implies that  
sk  is matched at  x  f(a(ȓ), ȓ, (ȓ)). Then,  sk’s  true payoff is  Vk(П(a(ȓ), ȓ), x) = 
П(a(ȓ), ȓ)k  rk  ȓk  rk > П(a(r) , r)k  rk = Vk(П(a(r), x), from which it follows 
that  sk  is not playing his best response, contradicting that  (r, a(.), (.))  is an SPE. 
Hence,  П(a(r), r) = p(a, r), so  V(П(a(r), r), x) = p(a, r)  r.   
 
Theorem 10. Consider any competitive price rule  П  C+  and let  (r, a(.), (.))  be 
an SPE of  (a, r, П, f). If  r  r  and  rk = rk  for every  sk  unmatched at  f(a(r), r, 
(r)), then  V(П(a(r), r), f(a(r), r, (r))) = p(a, r)  r  and  f(a(r), r, (r))  is 
optimal for  M(a, r). 
Proof. Denote  x  f(a(r), r, (r)). By Theorem 3 we know that  x  is optimal for  
M(a, r). We claim that  (p(a, r), x)  E(a, r). First,  p(a, r)  r  r, so  p(a, r)  is 
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feasible for  M(a, r). Second, the competitiveness of  p(a, r)  in  M(a, r)  implies its 
competitiveness in  M(a, r). Finally, every unsold object  at  x  gets its reservation 
price:  rk = rk. Then,  x  is also optimal for  M(a, r). 
We notice that on one hand  p(a, r)  p(a, r)  by the maximality of  p  in        
M(a, r). On the other hand,  p(a, r) ≥ p(a, r)  because  r ≥ r. Hence,  p(a, r) =     
p(a, r). Now use Theorem 10 to obtain that  П(a(r), r) = p(a, r) = p(a, r), and then  
V(П(a(r), r), x) = p(a, r)  r.   
 
Our final example shows that if seller  sk  is unmatched at some SPE outcome and  
rk > rk, the conclusion of Theorem 10 is not always true. As we see in the example 
below, by playing  rk > rk  he might make some matched agent better off without 
making himself worse off.   
 
Example 5 ((r, a(.), (.))  is an SPE of  (a, r, П, f)  with  П  C+  but                            
V(a(r), f(r, a(.), (.)) > p(a, r)  r;  П(a(r), r)  is a competitive price for  M(a, r)  
but it is not competitive for  M(a, r)). Consider  B = (b1, b2, b3),  S = (s1, s2, s3, s4),        
a1 = (5, 4, 0, 0.5),  a2 = (0, 5, 0, 0)  and  a3 = (4, 10, 5, 4.5),  r = (0, 0, 0, 0). Then,         
p = (4.5, 5, 0, 0)  and  p = (0, 5, 0, 0). Consider also the competitive price rule  П  C+  
and let  r = (0, 0, 0, 0.5). The optimal matchings for  M(a, r)  are  x  and  x, where    
x11 = x22 = x33 = 1  and  x11 = x23 = x32 = 1.  
Define  (a, )  as follows:  a1(r) = a2(r) = (5, 5, 0, 0.5),  a3(r) = (4, 10, 5, 5),  
jk(r) = 1  if  xjk = 1 or  xjk = 1  and  jk(r) = 0  otherwise. For  ȓ  r, let  (a(ȓ), (ȓ))  
be the NE given by Theorem 5 by making  u = u(ȓ). We will show that  (r, a(.), (.))  
is an SPE  but  V(П(a(r), r), f(a(r), r, (r))) = (5, 5, 0, 0) > p  r.  
First notice that the optimal matchings for  M(a(r), r)  signalized by  (r)  are  x  
and  x.  Both matchings are super-optimal for  M(a(r), r)  and  M(a, r).  
It is a matter of verification that in the market  M(a(r), r)  we have that                      
p(a(r), r) = p(a(r), r) = (5, 5, 0, 0.5), so seller  s4  is unmatched at any optimal 
matching chosen by  f(a(r), r, (r)),  V(П(a(r), r), f(a(r), r, (r))) = (5, 5, 0, 0)  
and  U(П(a(r), r), f(a(r), r, (r))) = (0, 0, 5). To prove that  (a(r), (r))  is an NE 
for the buyers suppose, by way of contradiction, that some buyer  bj  profits by choosing 
(ȃj  aj(r), j)  when the other buyers keep their strategies. Denote ȃ  (ȃj, aj(r)),  
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  (j, j(r))  and  y  f(ȃ, r, ). If  bj = b1, then  b1  must obtain a true payoff 
greater than zero by selecting  (ȃ1, 1). This implies that  b1  is not matched to  s3  at  y  
because  a13 = 0  and  b1  is not matched to  s4  at  y  either because  a14 = 1/2 = r4  
4(ȃ, r), so  b1  would not have a positive true payoff. If  y11 = 1, the matching  x  
defined above is optimal for  M(ȃ, r). Then, 10  p2(ȃ) = ȃ32  p2(ȃ)  ȃ33  p3(ȃ)  
ȃ33 = 5  by the competitiveness of  p(ȃ), and  so  p2(ȃ)  5. On the other hand,  x22 = 1, 
so  p2(ȃ)  5. Then,  p2(ȃ) = 5, so  ȃ21  p1(ȃ)  ȃ22  p2(ȃ) = 0, and  p1(ȃ)  ȃ21 = 5  
by the competitiveness of  p(ȃ). Therefore,  U1(П(ȃ, r), y, (r)))  0. If  y12 = 1, then  
y21 = y33 = 1  and, by arguing as before, we get that  p2(ȃ)  5. Consequently, 
U1(П(a(r), r), f(a(r), r, (r)))  0. Hence,  b1  cannot profit by deviating from  ȃ1, 
so  bj  b1. With analogous arguments we can see that  b2  cannot profit by deviating 
from  ȃ2. Therefore, bj = b3, and so U3(П(a(r), r), f(a(r), r, (r))) > 5. This implies 
that   b3  must be matched to  s2  because otherwise her true payoff would be less than or 
equal to 5. In this case, the matching  x  is optimal for  M(ȃ, r),  so  u2(ȃ) = 0  and  
p3(ȃ) = 0, and so  a22(r)  p2(ȃ)  u2(ȃ)  by the competitiveness of  p(ȃ). Then,          
5  p2(ȃ)  0, so  p2(ȃ)  5, and  U3(П(a(r), r), f(a(r), r, (r)))  5, which is a 
contradiction. Hence, no buyer can profit by deviating from her strategy and then    
(a(r), (r))  is an NE for the buyers.   
Now, we show that no seller  sk  has an incentive to deviate from  rk. Suppose, by 
way of contradiction, that there is some  sk  who is better off by choosing  ȓk. Denote    
ȓ  (ȓk, rk), with  ȓk > 0  if  k  4  and  ȓ4  0.5. Since  (a(ȓ), (ȓ))  is an NE and    
П  C+, Theorem 3 implies that  (П(a(ȓ), ȓ), f(a(ȓ), ȓ, (ȓ)))  E(a, ȓ). Clearly  sk  
s1  (seller  s1  does not have any incentive to deviate because he receives the highest 
possible payoff). Suppose that  sk = s2. To have  V2(П(a(ȓ), ȓ), f(a(ȓ), ȓ, (ȓ))) > 5,  
s2  should be matched to  b3  under  z  f(a(ȓ), ȓ, (ȓ)), which is an optimal matching 
for  M(a, ȓ). In this case  s3  cannot be matched to  b3, so  П3(a(ȓ), ȓ) = 0. Therefore, 
because (П(a(ȓ), z)  is competitive in  M(a, ȓ),  a32  П2(a(ȓ), ȓ)  a33  П3(a(ȓ), ȓ) 
= 5, from which follows that  П2(a(ȓ), ȓ)  10  5 = 5. Then,  V2(П(a(ȓ), ȓ), f(a(ȓ), 
ȓ, (ȓ))) = П2(a(ȓ), ȓ) – r2  5, which is a contradiction. If  sk = s3,  s3  is not 
acceptable for  b1  and  b2  in  M(a(ȓ), ȓ), since  a13 = a23 = 0 < ȓ3. Thus, in order to 
have  V3(П(a(ȓ), ȓ), f(a(ȓ), ȓ, (ȓ))) > 0,  s3  should be matched to  b3  at  f(a(ȓ), ȓ, 
(ȓ)), which is an optimal matching for  M(a, ȓ). The value of  f(a(ȓ), ȓ, (ȓ))  in  
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M(a, ȓ)  is  15  ȓ3. However, the value of the matching  z  in  M(a, ȓ), where  z11 = 
z32 = 1, is  a11(ȓ) + a32(ȓ) = 15 > 15  ȓ3, which contradicts the optimality of           
f(a(ȓ), ȓ, (ȓ)). Hence,  s3  cannot profit by deviating from  ȓ3. It remains to verify the 
case  sk = s4. In order to have  V4(П(a(ȓ), ȓ), f(a(ȓ), ȓ, (ȓ)) > 0,  s4  should be 
matched to some buyer at  f(a(ȓ), ȓ, (ȓ)), which is not possible because  s4  is 
unmatched at any optimal matching for  M(a, ȓ). Hence,  (r, a(.), (.))  is an SPE of  
(a, r, П, f).  
It is a matter of verification that  p(r) =(0, 5, 0, 0.5). Therefore, this example also 
illustrates that  M(a, r)  may have more than one competitive equilibrium.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
We have analyzed the SPE of centralized mechanisms for the buyer-seller game. In 
any such mechanism, each seller is asked to report the valuation of his object and then 
buyers are requested to report their valuations for all the objects (together with a signal 
to break ties). Given the reports, a competitive price rule selects a competitive 
equilibrium vector of prices (for the reported market) and a competitive matching rule 
provides a competitive equilibrium matching. 
At equilibrium, buyers and/or sellers often have an incentive not to report their 
valuations truthfully, as we know from previous literature. Still, we have shown that the 
SPE strategies typically lead to outcomes that are not only competitive equilibria for the 
reported economy but also for the true economy. While buyers’ SPE strategies may lead 
to the minimum competitive equilibrium prices, sellers profit from the first-mover 
advantage and, under reasonable conditions, all the SPE outcomes select the maximum 
competitive equilibrium prices for the true economy. 
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